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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between nationalism and public opinion in the region of 
Catalonia in contemporary Spain.  It analyzes the interaction of the climate of opinion, 
expectations, poll results, and political action.  This holistic approach permits a conclusion 
that successive Catalan governments and the political class, in an effort to solidify their 
foothold in and emerging democracy, have been successful in creating a climate of opinion 
that has encouraged the nationalist part of the Catalan population, concentrated 
proportionally in highest socioeconomic strata, to be actively involved in politics, while at the 
same time demobilizing a significant part of the working class, the sector of Catalan society 
most resistant to nationalism, by ignoring other social problems.
Introduction
“Should I remind them that the boy was a blue-collar worker: that is to say, a person who 
1
Fall 2010                                              Global Media Journal                                     Volume 10, Issue 17  
doesn’t do dialectic ostentation, a man with other problems?”
 (Juan Marsé, Last evenings with Teresa, 1966)
 
The recent literature on Catalan nationalism is prolific and its production has intensified with 
the devolution of power to the regions of Spain that took place during the transition to 
democracy following Franco’s death in 1975. Most studies acknowledge the historical reality 
of oppression during the Franco dictatorship of some cultural groups, including the Catalans, 
as a prelude to arguments supporting more autonomy, if not outright independence, for this 
region. As such, most of these studies focus on historical justifications, social aspects and the 
vindications of Catalan politicians to support the legitimacy of more self-government.
Nonetheless, most of these approaches justifying the idea of Catalonia as a “stateless nation” 
have shown significant theoretical and interpretive biases. First, most emphasize the strong 
sense of identity of the Catalans (Keating, 1996; Conversi, 1997; McRoberts, 2001; Gibernau, 
2006), but fail to mention that the same surveys they cite show the percentage of the 
population that feels some kind of Spanish-Catalan dual identity is majoritarian and never dips 
below 67 percent. Second, they focus on the positive attitude of the Catalan population 
toward more self-government (Lancaster, 1997), but avoid factors like the negative reactions 
of citizens to, for example, the implementation of linguistic policies that prioritize the Catalan 
language over the Spanish language in the public sphere (Martínez-Herrera, 2002). 
Most of these works end up at least partially mystifying Catalan nationalism thought the use of 
expressions such as “organic community,” “core values,” and “consensus” (Miley, 2007, p. 3). 
They ignore the social conditions under which public opinion is formed and do not take into 
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consideration relevant aspects such as the dominant climate of opinion, the expectations of 
the Catalan people, the level of political participation of the citizenship, and the social 
relations of power. Furthermore, although the variables of birthplace and native tongue would 
seem to be the most relevant when analyzing attitudes toward Catalan nationalism as 
demonstrated in surveys, the usual emphasis on the distinction between “Catalans” and 
“immigrants” has tended to denaturalize the debate and offer a slanted view of the situation. 
As an example, no Andalusian would argue seriously that he/she feels in a foreign land when 
working and living in Catalonia. An additional lacuna is the fact that, due to the time context, 
most of the existent analyses still rely on data from the decade of the nineties and have not 
been able to evaluate the repercussions of events as important as the approval of the third 
Statute of Autonomy in 2006. 
Theoretical framework
This paper argues that the post-Franco nationalist Catalan political class can be understood 
as a top-elite movement that has marginalized at least half of the Catalan people – mostly 
those whose first language is Spanish and those from lower classes – from the political and 
public sphere. This marginalization has come about in two ways. First, through the creation of 
a social “false consensus” (Ross, Greene, and House, 1977), a perception theory that refers 
to the tendency of individuals to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as common 
and appropriate to existing circumstances. This false consensus effect explains why, although 
a majority of Catalans don’t feel nationalist, they do not take an active role in opposing 
Catalan nationalist policies under the assumption that nationalist sentiment is overall 
aspirational, positive and ultimately necessary to integrate into Catalan society. Moreover, this 
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paper argues, this false consensus has been reinforced by a “spiral of silence” (Noelle-
Neumann, 1984) generated by a nationalist climate of opinion that has contributed to 
maintaining dissident opinions hidden. 
Second, the increasing demobilization of this segment of the Catalan public opinion and 
electorate demonstrates that the political discourse of the major Catalan parties, mostly 
focused on identity issues, has generated alienation among these strata of the population. 
This fact was evident in the last referendum to approve the third Statute of Autonomy in 2006: 
popular participation barely reached 50 percent and only 33 percent of the entire electorate 
voted for it. This result, on an issue as crucial as the level of self-government in a highly 
politicized region, should be considered together with the low levels of political participation in 
Catalonia in general  (60 percent participation on average in regional elections). The theory of 
a disconnection between the political elites and a large part of the electorate parallels 
explanations given for low levels of participation in American elections in the past. If 
historically one of the main complaints of American voters was that politicians ignored the real 
interests of the lower 60 percent of the economic strata (Avey, 1989), in the case of Catalonia 
we find a political party system that has clearly privileged identity issues over social issues. 
This reality sends a pessimistic message about the level of influence that the climate of 
opinion can exert upon public opinion and the demoralization that the inattentiveness of the 
political class to the real concerns of the population can cause among the citizenship, thus 
ultimately less likely to manifest their own opinions.
This paper argues that the public opinion phenomenon in Catalonia cannot be explained 
relying exclusively on poll results. It is only when we analyze and integrate other public 
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opinion components (social, informational and experiential) that we can interpret the public 
opinion dynamics in the region.
To analyze the relationship between the climate of opinion and the level of political 
involvement of the Catalan population, this author uses the multidimensional model of public 
opinion analysis developed by Jacob and Michal Shamir (2000) in their book The Anatomy of  
Public Opinion. This model not only relies on the analysis of the distribution of attitudes 
obtained in the polls but also on the climate of opinion, expectations, public speech and 
political action. 
In their study of the changes of the Israeli public opinion with regard to the devolution of the 
“West Bank” territories during the nineties, Jacob and Michal Shamir (2000) analyzed the 
following four facets: 
• ·       The climate of opinion that describes the most permanent values and a system 
of goals creating consensus among the members of a society. In order to 
assess the dominant climate of opinion in Catalonia, this paper examines the 
role of the media in setting a public agenda where an identitarian frame is used 
to explain and interpret Catalan reality. 
• ·        The prospective-informational facet looks at the impact social and political 
events have on people’s lives and in shaping the population’s outlook at any 
point in time (Shamir & Shamir, 2000). This facet embodies general aspects like 
the content of mass media discourse as well as a social impact analysis of other 
factors, such as the effects on the population of the implementation of linguistic 
policies to promote the Catalan language in the public sphere. 
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• ·        The evaluative dimension assesses personal attitudes and values as they are 
commonly picked up by opinion polls. This section of the article examines the 
results of recent polls regarding identity issues, political orientation and voting 
attitudes, among other factors.
• ·        The behavioral facet emphasizes the public manifestation of public opinion 
and its communicative nature. This section applies two perception theories, “the 
false consensus effect” (Ross et al., 1977) and “the spiral of silence” (Noelle-
Neumann, 1984), to explain the low level of voter participation in regional 
elections and the referendum for the third Statute of Autonomy. 
Methodology
For the purpose of obtaining information to evaluate the convergence and divergence of the 
four public opinion facets detailed above, the authors have collected, analyzed and 
interpreted data from numerous secondary (official, academic and media) sources in different 
fields (media studies, political science, sociology, etc…). Included are the main sociological 
statistical surveys implemented in Catalonia by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (“Center of 
Opinion Studies”), an organ of the Catalan autonomous government dedicated to 
implementing polls and surveys analyzing the political and social evolution of Catalan society. 
Catalonia is a highly politicized region where politics and identity play a key role in the content 
of the media industry. It is perhaps symptomatic of the state of public opinion in Catalonia that 
in the thirty years that nationalist issues have monopolized the public agenda, extensive 
research on media coverage of Catalan nationalism is scarce. For example, between 2004 
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and 2006, there were 67 dissertations on the topic of communication in Catalan universities 
and only one treating the topic from the point of view of the media coverage of the President 
of the Generalitat (Catalan Government) during the electoral campaign (Moragas i Spa, Civil i 
Serra, Reguero i Jiménez and Sedó, 2007).  Nevertheless, there are partial analyses in these 
dissertations about how the regional government has extensively used the public media over 
the last thirty years to create a strong identification between nationalism and citizenship in 
Catalonia. The most common has been the use of tactics of national territorial socialization 
that question the legal frame of Catalonia as a region within Spain. 
TV3 [the main public broadcast channel) not only contributes to shore up the nation, but also to 
construct the myths and symbols of nationalism and to socialize them as those of all Catalonia. TV3 
is  more  than  a  television  station,  since  it  not  only  aspires  to  entertain  or  inform,  but  also  to  
nationalize.
Thus if the objective is to construct the Paisos Catalans [Catalan countries], the weather maps will 
reflect these territories; if Catalan must be the only language of the country, the soap operas show a 
country in which –ignoring the socio-linguistic reality- no-one speaks Castilian. (Santamaría, 1999, 
pp. 50-51; as cited in Etherington, 2003, pp. 265-266).
As  explained  in  the  Corporació  Catalana  de  Mitjans  Audiovisuals  (CCMA)  [Catalan 
Corporation of Audiovisual Media] website, the Catalan government – with the objective of 
helping consolidate and expand the use of the Catalan language, culture and identity – owns  
the main media conglomerate operating in Catalonia. CCMA is a public broadcast service in  
Catalan with six television broadcast channels, including the flagship TV3; four radio stations, 
including audience leader Catalunya Radio; and the Catalan News Agency (Agencia Catalana 
de  Noticies),  among  other  companies.  CCMA’s  2,000  employees  are  equivalent  to  
approximately 25 percent of the entire audiovisual sector in Catalonia, which employs 8,063 
people (excluding the film and video industry) (Estadística de l’audiovisual a Catalunya, 2007,  
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p. 89). The importance of the public sector in the creation of opinion is also supported by the  
fact  that  CCMA’s  TVC  (Catalonia  Television)  outsources  numerous  productions  to  other 
companies in the region that  depend on public  funds for  their  survival  (Baró & Cubelles, 
2006). 
The market advantages CCMA enjoys in terms of budget and human resources shape the 
map of audiences. The public broadcast television and radio networks lead audience rankings 
with levels of penetration of 90.6 and 56.1 percent respectively (Baròmetre de la Comunicació 
i la Cultura, 2008). Furthermore, as in the rest of Spain, it is necessary to emphasize that the 
Parliament  of  Catalonia  elects  the  board  of  the  CCMA and,  subsequently,  it  is  a  highly 
politicized media conglomerate. 
With regard to television consumption patterns, the combined audience of the two main public 
channels, TV3 and KC33, represents 25 percent of the total. This data acquires even greater  
relevance where public opinion is concerned if  we take into consideration that TV3 offers 
twice  as  many news  shows  as  the  rest  of  the  national  channels  (55.6  percent)  (Prado, 
Delgado, García, and Larrégola, 2007). 
The public radio broadcast system, Catalunya Ràdio, also clearly leads audience rankings 
with 564,000 listeners, or approximately one third of the entire audience (Martí, 2007). As part 
of  its  mission  to  promote  the  Catalan  language,  the  Catalan  government  also  offered 
important subsidies to RAC1, the third most listened to radio, to the tune of 700,000 Euros 
between  2005  and  2006  (Ferreirós  &  De  Angelis,  January  22,  2008).  In  practice,  these 
numbers allow one to conclude that the regional government directly or indirectly controls 50  
percent of the radio landscape in Catalonia.  It is important to emphasize that radio in Spain 
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differs from other countries in that it is a much more opinionated media than television and 
dedicates considerably more space and time to opinions and political  information through 
newscasts, talk shows and audience phone-ins. 
The influence of the printed press on the climate of opinion in Catalonia is minor compared to 
television and radio. As in the rest of Spain, the level of penetration of newspapers among the  
Catalan  population  is  one  of  the  lowest  among  OECD  countries  (Baròmetre  de  la 
Comunicació i la Cultura, 2008). Nonetheless, the newspapers are highly influential among 
elites and communication professionals. There are two key characteristics to keep in mind 
about the Catalan press landscape (González Cabezas, 1995, p. 97). The first is the high  
level of politicization: the two main regional newspapers,  El Periódico de Catalunya and La 
Vanguardia, which  together  account  for  approximately  half  of  the  Catalan  newspaper 
readership (Barómetre de la Comunicació i la Cultura, 2008), each clearly support a political  
party: respectively, PSC, a branch of the Spanish Worker’s Socialist party, and Convergència i 
Unió (CiU), the main conservative Catalan nationalist party (González Cabezas, 1995, pp. 97-
98). The second characteristic is the press’ dependence on public funds via direct subsidies:  
during the biennium 2005/2006, El Periódico de Catalunya received 1.43 million Euros from 
the  regional  government,  and  La  Vanguardia  674,000  Euros  (De  Angelis,  September  2, 
2008). Furthermore, institutional publicity represents a second substantial  source of public 
funding for the Catalan press. The regional government, the main advertiser in Catalonia, 
spent almost 10 million Euros advertising in the regional press in 2007 alone (Anguera de 
Sojo, July 28, 2008). Yet perhaps the most remarkable fact with regard to the influence the 
Catalan government yields over the press is its 20 percent ownership of Avui, a Catalan-only 
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newspaper. This is a case unique in Europe.
The Catalan government has used its direct control of the public regional media conglomerate 
and its indirect sway of private media through the allocation of subsidies to create a strongly 
identitarian climate of opinion. Perhaps the best example of this media pressure was seen 
recently in the simultaneous publication in 12 Catalan newspapers of a united editorial called 
“La dignidad de Cataluña” (The dignity of Catalonia), a journalistic resource usually reserved 
for situations of national emergency such as a coup d’état. Conceived as a way to intimidate 
the  Spanish  Constitutional  Court  in  case  of  an  eventual  cutting  of  the  new  Statute  of 
Autonomy, this editorial was an example of the instrumentalization of the Catalan newspapers 
by the regional government. 
In addition to the creation of a nationalist climate of opinion through the use of media that  
emphasizes the existence of a  Catalan problem within Spain, the Catalan government has 
employed a strategy of occupying the public sphere and generally demotivating those citizens 
without an identitarian concern. This strategy involves the strong display of an autonomous 
government apparatus with the purpose of establishing identification between nationalism and 
well-being. This capillary process is described in the following section. 
Expectations and Prospective Information Sources
A nation-building process
All of the various post-Franco governments in Catalonia have strived for “nation building.” In  
practical terms, this has meant restoring everyday use of the Catalan language as well as  
creating a national identification and self-governing institutions (Martínez-Herrera, 2002, p. 
430). These policies were implemented as soon as the regional institutions were created in 
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the years following Franco’s death. The second Statute of Autonomy of 1979 acknowledged 
that  Catalonia had its  own historical,  cultural  and linguistic  personality within  Spain.  This 
Statute  provided  Catalonia  with  the  greatest  self-government  of  its  history,  a  unitary 
government,  its  own  parliament,  and  competencies  in  education,  public  order,  health,  
transport and communications. The Statute was reformed in 2006 and approved again in a 
referendum. This third Statute expanded the competencies and in many aspects implied a 
bilateral de facto relationship between the regional government and the national government 
of Spain. 
In their daily lives, Catalans have become accustomed to identifying with the regional political  
structure  by voting  in  regional  elections,  paying  regional  taxes,  being  subject  to  regional 
regulations and being represented abroad by regional institutions (Martínez-Herrera, 2000, p.  
429;  Díez  Nicolás,  1999).  Since  its  inception,  the  Catalan  government  has  pursued  a 
localized replication of the powers and symbols of Spain’s government. Catalonia has its own 
police force, sends officials to visit foreign countries, and possesses ornamental signs such 
as  a  flag,  a  national  anthem,  and  so  on  (Moreno,  2001,  p.  101).  Furthermore,  regional 
institutions have not only promoted the Catalan identity but also supported and, to a certain 
extent, tried to control the entire civil society. Indeed, most cultural activities and numerous 
organizations within  Catalan society  have come to  depend in  one fashion  or  another  on 
support from the Catalan government and local authorities (McRoberts, 1996, pp. 116-122). 
This has strongly affected the climate of opinion since many of these organizations work to  
develop studies, publish materials and organize events to promote the Catalan identitarian 
justifications. This occupation of the public sphere by different means has aimed to generate 
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among the  public  opinion  the  perception  that  not  only does the  government  support  the 
“nation-building”  process  but  the  citizenship  as  a  whole.  A good  example  has  been  the 
recurrent utilization of the Barcelona soccer team as a platform for nationalist vindications. 
One of the most memorable uses of synergies by different civil society associations happened 
when, in the middle of a soccer match, the Coordinadora de Asociaciones para la Lengua 
Catalana  (Coordinator  of  Pro-Catalan  Language  Associations)  walked  onto  the  lawn  to 
display a huge poster in favor of the promotion of the Catalan language and a map in which  
other regions appeared as a part of the països catalans (Vázquez, October 10, 2005). 
One of the regional government’s strategies has been to emphasize a sentiment of grievance 
among the citizenship. The topic of the fiscal deficit that Catalonia has with the rest of Spain,  
according to which Catalonia receives much less from the central government than their total  
contribution to the Spanish Treasury, has received extensive coverage in the local media. 
Thus, and despite the fact that the local empowerment has brought a renaissance of the 
cacique, or provincial political boss, phenomenon (Reid, 2008), Catalans express a high level 
of satisfaction with their regional institutions. Even among non-nationalists, 95 percent say 
they believe more decentralization leads directly to a higher quality of life (Lancaster, 1997).
An elitist discourse
There  are,  however,  other  factors  that,  although  more  subtle,  may  have  contributed  to 
alienating a significant part of the population from the public sphere and the civic life. Among  
these factors are persistent inter-class differences, and the effects of the implementation of 
linguistic policies in Catalonia.
Regarding  the  first  factor,  the  analysis  of  different  segments  of  Catalan  society  has 
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demonstrated that the nationalist movement can be best understood as “ethnic”, “an elite-led, 
‘top down’ project” (Miley, 2006, p. 3). Awareness of Catalan identity tends to be much more 
developed among those born in Catalonia, whose “mother tongue” is Catalan, and among 
those with higher levels of education and elite professional positions such as teachers or 
politicians (p. 3). In fact, the sentiment of alienation from politics of a large percentage of 
Catalan voters can be better  explained by socioeconomic status than by place of  origin.  
Although the percentage of the Catalan population born in other parts of Spain has decreased 
considerably in the last 30 years from 39 per cent in 1975 (Conversi, 1997, p.191; as cited in  
Rebagliato, 1978, p. 256) to 33 per cent in 2006 (Idescat, 2006), the percentage of people  
who declare in polls that they are uninterested in politics, approximately 50 percent, or have 
abstained in  regional  elections and referendums,  40  per  cent  (Centre  d’Estudis  d’Opinió, 
2007), has remained consistently high relative to populations in other Spanish regions. 
If  we  take  into  consideration  some  key  socioeconomic  indicators  related  to  health  and 
education, we can infer that the high percentage of the Catalan adult population that feels  
disconnected from politics can be understood as a sign of  frustration with  an identitarian 
discourse that doesn’t address their real problems.  For example, the Public Health Agency of 
Barcelona  documented  that  between  1993  and  1995  the  difference  of  life  expectancy 
between men could differ  by 10 years according to  their  socioeconomic status (Borrell  & 
Benach,  2006).  A report  by  the  Program  For  International  Student  Assessment  (PISA),  
diagnosed Catalonia as one of the Spanish regions with the most  direct links between a 
parent’s income and the possibility of  going to  college (2003).  Thus,  between 30 and 35 
percent of Catalan parents in the middle or upper middle class send their children to private 
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schools, which enjoy the highest public subsidies of Spain, while most working class families  
send their kids to public schools with one of the lowest public expenses per student (Navarro,  
February 1, 2005). Although there are other data, such as the distribution of income, that 
place Catalonia in accordance with European standards (Cordero, May 28, 2007), these key 
qualitative indicators reflecting such different levels of mortality and education according to  
social class of origin clearly underscore the existence of a social gap. Indeed, the absence of  
social data is a characteristic of the Catalan media, which prioritize identitarian topics over 
other social issues due to the previously discussed power of the Catalan elites to configure 
the public agenda. A clear example of this was the level of attention paid by all Catalan media 
to the denial by the International Federation of Hockey of a Catalan national team and, in  
contrast, around the same time the media silence concerning the two aforementioned reports 
illustrating the existence of broad class inequalities in the Catalan society (Navarro, February 
1, 2005). This disproportion becomes even more significant if we take into consideration that 
70 percent of the Catalan population define themselves as working class (Institut d’Estudis 
Regionals I Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2004). 
The implementation of identitarian linguistic policies
Joan  Maragall,  a  former  President  of  the  Catalan  government,  once  called  the  Catalan 
language “the DNA of Catalonia” (Barbeta, November 28, 2004). Indeed, the implementation 
of laws to foster the use of Catalan in the public sphere has been an axis of regional politics  
(Martínez-Herrera,  2002,  p.  447).  And  yet,  controversy  met  the  approval  by the  Catalan 
parliament of both the Law of Linguistic Normalization in 1983 and the Law of Linguistic Policy 
in  1998,  both  of  which  promoted  the  use  of  Catalan  in  the  public  sphere  including  in 
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government offices, educational institutions, as the means of social communication, in cultural 
industries and in business. The Statute of Autonomy states that Spanish and Catalan are the 
official languages of Catalonia, but the two aforementioned laws prioritizing the use of Catalan 
effectively acknowledged that Catalan in fact held an inferior position to Spanish in Catalonia 
despite its use by the government and many media (McRoberts, 1996, p.145). Nonetheless, 
considering that Spanish is the first language for 53 percent of the Catalan population, versus 
Catalan for 40 percent (Idescat, 2003), the reaction against the imposition of Catalan as the 
sole language – for instance, in schools – has not been as strong as might be expected. The 
reason may well be that for a majority of Spanish speakers accustomed to seeing the greater 
social and economic status of Catalan speakers. Catalan-only education represents a vehicle 
for social progress. Some parents certainly have experienced the frustration that their children 
have not been able to receive their education in their “mother tongue” or that the rate of 
school  failure  for  this  reason  is  higher  among  Spanish  speakers  (PISA,  2003),  but  the 
mobilization capacity of this segment of the population has been very limited. Although a new 
political  party,  Ciutadans  de  Catalunya (Citizens  of  Catalonia),  and  a  civic  platform, 
Convivencia Cívica Catalana (Catalan Civic Convivence), were born in the last 10 years to 
protest the lack of recognition Catalan institutions give to the bicultural and bilingual nature of 
Catalan society, they are still relatively marginal movements in numerical terms.  Ciutadans 
obtained three delegates of 135 total in the Catalan parliament in the last elections while the  
main accomplishment of Convivencia Cívica Catalana was the gathering of 50,000 signatures 
in support of the defense of education in children’s mother tongue and bilingualism in schools.  
Although not irrelevant, neither accomplishment points to any sort of popular revolt against  
identitarian and linguistic  policies.  Moreover,  the process of  creation of  the political  party 
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Ciutadans de Catalunya can be understood as another example of how Catalan society is 
structured according to elitist bases since, far from being considered a grassroots movement, 
this  new party  was  founded  by a  group  of  well-known Catalan  intellectuals  who  felt  the 
necessity to protest against the official identitarian policies.
Attitudes and behaviors
In 1979, 68 percent of the Catalan population felt only Spanish or as Spanish as Catalan: 35 
percent identified themselves as Spanish only or more Spanish than Catalan, and 33 percent 
felt equally Spanish and Catalan (Martínez-Herrera, 2002, p. 435). In 2007, only 50 percent 
felt only Spanish or as Spanish as Catalan, while the other 50 percent felt more Catalan than 
Spanish (30 percent) or only Catalan (20 percent) (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2007). 
It  seems clear  that  since 1979 the  Catalan  parties  have been successful  in  forging  and 
strengthening  a  Catalan  identity  among  the  population.  During  the  last  30  years  “more 
Spanish”  identification  has  decreased  while  dual  Spanish/Catalan  and  “more  Catalan” 
identification has grown (Martínez-Herrera, 2002, p. 436). This evolution of sentiment about 
identity can be explained by the hegemonic role of  the Catalan government as the main  
provider of services for Catalan citizens, the holder of Catalan symbols, and the guiding force 
behind the climate of opinion created by the regional media. 
If the word consensus was widely used during the transition period to democracy in Spain to  
describe the necessity for the different political factions to try to see eye to eye on matters, in 
Catalonia this word has had an additional connotation meaning a need to combine efforts  
around the reinforcement of  the Catalan identity.  While the benefits  of  this doctrine were 
evident for Catalan elites who stood to gain more of a foothold as political  and economic 
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leaders in this new society, the benefits were not so clear for Catalan residents born outside 
the region or for non-elites. In this sense, the role of the regional government and the media 
was decisive in generating the perception that the development of the Catalan identity and 
self-governing institutions was a substantial part of the democratic process and, thus both 
appropriate  and desirable.  This  situation  has been defined as  a  “false  consensus effect”  
(Sherman,  Presson,  and Chassin,  1984;  as cited  in  Glasser  & Salmon,  1995),  since the 
necessity of social support and validation by a significant part of the population, comprised 
mostly but not entirely of people born outside Catalonia, would have led them to view tacitly 
the promotion of the sentiment of Catalan identity. 
There are also indicators that allow one to infer the existence of a “spiral of silence,” (Noelle-
Neumann, 1995), or the use of public opinion as a tool of social control. This would suggest 
that  in  order  to  be  accepted  as  “plain  Catalan  citizens,”  a  significant  percentage  of  the 
population  born  in  other  parts  of  Spain  would  have  softened  their  positions  against  
nationalism or  at  least  adopted  a  passive  attitude.  A “spiral  of  silence”  may  have  been 
manifested during the referendum campaign to vote the third Statute of Catalan Autonomy as 
a result of a concerted action by almost the entire political  spectrum, the media, and the  
business community (which signed a petition endorsing the new document) to generate a 
favorable climate of opinion. 
Catalan entrepreneurs put aside their traditional prudence and aligned themselves squarely 
with the Catalan government supporting a document that talked of Catalonia as a “nation,” a 
concept not welcomed by the rest of Spaniards who are, after all,  the biggest market for  
Catalan companies. The consequence of this entrepreneurial  positioning was a boycott of 
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Catalan products by many Spaniards. It should be acknowledged that a significant part of  
these Catalan entrepreneurs might have experienced at least a sentiment of apprehension 
with regard to the consequences that a different attitude could have for their relationship with 
the Catalan government.
Something similar  can be said about  the main Catalan newspapers that  signed a united 
editorial affirming that the Statute had “enjoyed overwhelming social and political support” (La 
Vanguardia,  2009) by the Catalan citizenship.  Only a third of  Catalans voted on the new 
Statute, and only 37.5 of them say they think of Catalonia as a nation (see table 1), one of the 
most controversial issues of the new Statute. This case represents a classic example of what 
Floyd Allport (1937, p.12) called “journalistic fallacy,” or the tendency to confuse public opinion 
with the presentation of opinion by the media when trying to capture public sentiment.
 
Table 1: Catalonia: A Region or a Nation?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Region                   52.7
Nation                    37.5
Other                      8.0
DK/DA                  1.7
TOTAL                  100
 
Source: CIS study 2410 (2001)
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The analysis of the behavior of Catalans in political surveys prior to the referendum and their 
levels of voter participation also illustrate a willingness by many to express opinions similar to 
the ones perceived in the climate of opinion and hide their  disconformities.  For example, 
despite the fact that in polls implemented a few days before the referendum, 97.7 percent of  
the Catalan electorate said they knew about this new document, and 86.9 percent said they 
were sure or very sure of voting, the level of participation was only 49.6 percent (Centre  
d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2006a) (see table 2). 
 
Table 2: Referendums for the Statute of Autonomy
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year                        Abstention
2006                        50.59
1979                        40.66
 
Source: Statistical Institute of Catalonia
 
These  figures  suggest  that  a  considerable  number  of  Catalans  did  not  go  to  vote  but  
answered affirmatively  to  the  survey because they understood that  to  go  to  vote  was in 
agreement with the perceived climate of opinion. Moreover, the 74 percent of Catalans who 
voted in favor of  the new law, roughly 36.6 of the entire electorate, is a percentage that  
coincides with  the  size  of  the  professional  or  upper-middle  class  in  the  region  (Navarro,  
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February 1, 2005). 
The  “spiral  of  silence”  translates  into  political  apathy  and  a  demobilization  of  a  large 
percentage of Catalans. An analysis of the profile of those who abstained in the referendum 
vote shows a strong correlation between degree of disinterest  with regard to politics and 
identitarian issues (more or less equivalent in Catalonia) and identification with the working 
class and with Spain as a primary community of reference. A total 60 percent of abstentionists 
said they felt  either as Spanish as Catalan (40 percent),  more Spanish than Catalan (10 
percent) or only Spanish (10 percent), a number that was 50 percent in the same survey for 
the entire population (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2006b). A majority of the abstentionists (72 
percent) had at least one parent born outside Catalonia, while only 27.7 percent had two 
Catalan-born parents. Only five percent of the abstentionist’s parents had college degrees 
and at least half primary studies (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2006b).  This correlation of data 
permits the conclusion that as a reaction against the dominant nationalistic climate of opinion 
an important part of the population has simply dropped out of politics. This segment probably 
expressed more interest and support for the new Statute in polls than they ever felt. Indeed 
the index of participation obtained in the referendum not only diverged substantially from the  
polls prior  to the votes, but also from all  the levels of  abstention reached in any Catalan 
elections  in  the  region’s  post-Franco  history  of  local  Catalan  elections  (40  percent  as 
average) (see table 3). 
 
Table 3: Elections for the Parliament of Catalonia
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Year                        Abstention
2006                        43.22
2003                        36.62
1999                        40.1
1995                        36.01
1992                        45.02
1988                        40.59
1984                        35.67
1980                        38.56
______________________________________________________________________________
Source: Statistical Institute of Catalonia
 
The hypothesis of a spiral of silence as a prior step to political demobilization can also be  
understood by examining the priorities of the Catalan society as a whole. When asked about  
the main problems that afflicted Catalan society during the months prior to the approval of the 
new Statute, a majority of Catalans ranked issues related to nationalism, relations between 
Spain and Catalonia, and the crisis of Catalan identity, 13 and 14, respectively, on a list of 18  
items, far behind the problems of housing, lack of infrastructures, and immigration (Centre 
d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2006a), issues that – not surprisingly – affect the working class the most. 
Levels of electoral abstention in Catalonia have been substantially higher than in the rest of 
Spain, with 26 percent in general elections and 35 percent in local elections (Boix & Riba, 
2000, p. 98). Inequalities are no less marked in the rest of Spain, but lacking the identitarian 
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factor the political discourse probably responds somewhat better to the demands and real 
problems of the citizens. 
Since  traditional  interpretation  associates  political  demobilization  with  less  urbanized  and 
developed areas, Catalonia becomes even more exceptional within a Spanish context since it  
is one of the most urbanized and developed Spanish regions. Moreover, Catalonia, like the 
rest of Spain, lacks the barriers that affect voter participation in other countries – such as 
voter  registration  in  the  United  States.  Subsequently,  the  political  demobilization  of  the 
working class in Catalonia only can be explained through a double sentiment of alienation: on 
the one hand, the adverse climate of opinion created against those who oppose the official,  
elite-sustained identitarian policies; on the other hand, those, practically the same segment of 
the population, who feel ignored by the political elites and for whom, after a long period of 
unresponsiveness, mobilization has become that much more difficult (Avey, 1989, p. 125).  
The  approval  of  the  third  Statute  of  Catalonia,  after  30  years  of  autonomy,  seems  to  
consolidate a division between the interests of the political, economic and cultural elites and a 
significant part of the working class that, unconcerned with issues of identity, feels excluded 
from the political discourse.
 
Concluding remarks
The class-vindictive discourse of the Catalan left  during the Franco regime switched to a 
nationalist discourse in conjunction with the traditional Catalan right after Franco’s death in 
1975. The expectations of an important segment of the Catalan population, mostly working 
class and Spanish speaking, were frustrated by the absence of a majoritarian political option  
more  concerned  with  social  issues.  In  addition,  the  climate  of  opinion  generated  by  the 
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regional media, whose informational context is identitarian, has contributed to the political and 
civic disillusion of this part of the population. 
An analysis of the public opinion facets permits us to infer that the nationalistic discourse of  
the successive regional  governments was successful  in creating a climate of opinion that 
affected citizenship in two ways: first, by solidifying and mobilizing that part of the citizenship 
with the strongest sentiment of Catalan identity; and second, by demobilizing the rest of the 
population more concerned with other social problems. 
Unfortunately, studies on Catalan nationalism have tended to adopt a top-down paradigm, 
focusing on the political vindications of the ruling class and the climate of opinion created by 
the  regional  government,  and  minimizing  other  factors  such  as  the  social  and  political 
circumstances that affect public opinion. Ultimately, this analysis illustrates that traditionally 
one  of  the  main  problems  in  analyzing  Catalan  nationalism  has  been  the  unempirical  
assumption of its theoretically “civic” nature, which has led to its consideration as a mass 
movement.  Nevertheless,  the  analysis  of  the  public  opinion  dynamics  acknowledges  the 
existence of a significant part of the society that, unidentified with Catalan nationalism, feels 
marginal to the political discourse.
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